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REVIEWS

THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY. By Arthur R. 1.vJ.iller. Ann Arbor,
Mich.: The University of Michigan Press. 1971. Pp. 325. $7.95.
In spite of the successful adjustment man has made to the machine
in many contexts, it would be foolish not to recognize . . . [the effect] that certain applications of the computer may have on that
elusive value we call "personal privacy." [p. 3.]
This book ... will not simply catalog the great strides being taken
in the computer world or goggle over the predictions and projections of the scientific community's enthusiasts. Rather, its aim is to
explore some of the ways in which information technology is altering basic patterns in our daily life and to evaluate the responses
being made by the law, government, industry, and other institutions .... [p. 2.]

In these words Arthur R. Miller defines the task of The Assault
on Privacy, a task the book carries out with a systematic, machinelike efficiency. While The Assault on Privacy is an unmistakable call
to arms against a descending "dossier dictatorship," it avoids the
strident generalizations and glib platitudes that often envelop works
on the emotion-laden subject of privacy. Even as he trots out the
familiar hypothetical parade of horribles,1 Professor Miller demonstrates an admirable restraint and sense of perspective. Combining
these features with the inexhaustible research of a true scholastic
virtuoso, Professor Miller's book demands recognition as a genuinely
outstanding contribution to the field of privacy protection.2
One of the most impressive aspects of the small volume is the
extensive documentation that makes it an invaluable reference work.
[n order to give his assertions the tone of conclusive authority,
Professor Miller has combed thousands of pages of congressional
hearings, hundreds of periodicals and books by computerists, social
scientists, and legal analysts, and the complete works of Shakespeare
-all presumably without the aid of a computer.3 While his insist. No current work on privacy is complete without some catalog of the awful
potential of modem surveillance technology. Professor Miller, for example, points out
that it is possible to monitor a human being with sensors that can reveal his activities
and emotions and that computer technology is such that information contained in a
twenty-page dossier on every American could be stored for almost instant retrieval on
one computer tape (pp. 12, 45-46).
2. In the opinion of the reviewer this is one of three important books in the
privacy field. THE EAVESDROPPERS, by S. Dash, R. Schwartz & R. Knowlton (1959),
sounded the first warning bell against the growing capabilities of electronic surveillance
and was a major impetus to the first United States Supreme Court rejection of
electronically seized evidence (Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961)). The
other major work is Alan '\\Testin's complete treatise, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967).
3. It is as if Professor Miller commanded a small army of researchers, but of
course that would be impossible in today's tight budget situation.
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tence on commencing each subsection of the book with a quotation,
often of esoteric origin, sometimes seems a little pushy,4 one is inclined to forgive him for this small vanity in view of the end product.
From his description of computer technology and terminology to his
review and analysis of the relevant law, Professor Miller convinces
his reader that he knows what he is talking about.
In substance, the book argues that privacy is threatened by the
growing use of computer technology and that safeguards are required if we are to limit the detrimental aspect of these omnipotent,
omniscient tools.
[I]he computer, with its insatiable appetite for information, its
image of infallibility, and its inability to forget anything that has
been stored in it, may become the heart of a surveillance system
that will tum society into a transparent world in which our homes,
our finances, and our associations will be bared to a wide range of
casual observers, including the morbidly curious and the maliciously
or commercially intrusive. [p. 3.]
One problem in protecting privacy from the probing button
pushers of computer-based services is the apparent willingness of
millions of citizens to trade personal information for the advantage of the issuance of credit, welfare payments, insurance, and the
like. These institutional benefits are conferred only after machines
have digested and analyzed large amounts of private data that must
be supplied by the applicant, and getting the consent of the applicant to supply such data has presented no serious problem. Assuming, as Professor Miller does, the desirability and continued vitality
of data-based services, the question becomes one of regulation rather
than elimination. To use Miller's dimpled turn of a phrase, the
question is, How to live with the computer?
l.

CONTROLLING THE USE OF PRIVATE INFORMATION

The thrust of Miller's proposals in this area focuses upon limiting the use of private data as opposed to its acquisition. 5 His useoriented regulations revolve around the premise that personal
information surrendered for a particular purpose and to a limited
audience (e.g., credit data given to a bank for purposes of a loan)
should not be used for any other purpose or seen by any other
audience (e.g., the credit data should not be made available to po4 For esoteric sources, some all-time favorites can be found in THE AssAULT ON
PRIVACY. Among the special gems are a limerick from the Hamilton College Alumni
Review (p. 105); a quote from Viscount Buckmaster's Introduction to A. P. Herbert's
UNCOMMON LAw (p. 169); and a relevant word from Pope Pius XII in a speech delivered
to the Congress of the International Association of Applied Psychology (p. 216).
5. For a laboring of this distinction, see Josephson, Book Review, 15 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 1586, 1590-93 (1968).
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tential employers). While this position is rooted in the traditional
definition of privacy-the ability of a person to control the dissemination of information about himself-it is one that has not
fared well in court. Therefore, the legal problems involved in such
proposals do merit some attention.
Of particular relevance is the United States Supreme Court's
handling of the unauthorized use of private information by an informant posing as a friend, co-conspirator, or confidant. Whether
the informant utilizes a tape recorder, as in Lopez v. United States 6
and Osborn v. United States,1 or merely serves as a human conduit
to the police, as in Hoffa v. United States, 8 the Court has consistently
held that once information is freely given, the giver loses his right
to control its further use. The rationale of this result is that by choosing to reveal private information one assumes the risk that a confidant will betray him, and he will not be heard to protest the
consequences of his misplaced confidence. Implicit in this holding is
the theory that when information is released to another it is done
wholly and unconditionally, regardless of the intentions of the
speaker. Like the squeezing of toothpaste out of the tube, the revelation of private information is irrevocable.
It can be argued that the later case of Katz v. United States,9
which defined constitutionally protected privacy in terms of one's
"reasonable expectations," ought to modify these holdings and at
least require an ad hoc determination of whether the speaker could
have "reasonably expected" a particular confidant to transmit the
information to the police. It is one thing to say that a night club proprietor could reasonably expect an IRS agent to reject a bribe and
report the incident to his superiors,10 and quite another to apply the
same theory to a long-time friend and business associate.11 Thus,
Katz could be read to suggest that a person assumes the risk of
betrayal only when he has no reasonable expectation of privacy, that
careful selection of one's confidants is all that is required to invoke
the protections of the fourth amendment. This is not, however, the
present interpretation of the Katz case, and the reluctance of the
courts to extend the scope of privacy and limit the use of conversations in the informant area ought to be considered in the context
of restricting the use of voluntarily revealed personal data in the
computer privacy setting.
Why should a man assume the risk that one who poses as his
6. 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
7, 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
8. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
9. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
10. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
11. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
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friend will abuse his trust and misuse information given him and yet
not assume the same risk when dealing with an impersonal service
organization? In terms of both the knmvn risks and one's reasonable
expectations, the arguments for a loss of control over personal information are stronger in the data-gathering context than in the
court-considered informant situation. One who fills out a form or
application as a condition precedent to a benefit he seeks knows that
the information supplied may be read, checked, and examined by
a number of strangers from clerks to investigators and programmers.
By the test of Lopez and Katz the applicant has no reasonable expectation that these persons will act in good faith or with the utmost
discretion, and he could be deemed to assume the risk that either the
institution or its functionaries will use the information for other
purposes. Furthermore, when the government attempts to limit the
way in which certain information can be disseminated, there are
significant free speech considerations to be met. If a credit company
employee is, in essence, sworn to secrecy, may he be enjoined from
testifying in court as well as gossiping to a friend? While such a
problem is not insuperable, it is suggestive of the difficulties implicit in legislative attempts to limit the use of information.
The cases refusing to invoke the right of privacy in a constitutional sense are not applicable to legislative action that seeks to
grant greater individual protections than the minimum standards set
forth by the Supreme Court. This point is particularly evident as
one shifts the focus from a criminal investigation context (in which
the public interest in obtaining and using private information is
somewhat compelling) to the powers of civil service-oriented institutions.
In addition, the rationale of the Lopez and Katz decisions is subject to direct frontal attack. The concept of viewing privacy in
terms of one's reasonable expectations is laden with the seeds of selfdestruction. If the question of privacy entails only the protection of
one's actual expectations, without regard to justifiable claims for
greater protection, the right of privacy will shrink in direct proportion to the expansion of surveillance practices. By disclaimer or by
formal notice, the private credit company or the governmental
agency could enlarge its right to use information merely by announcing its intention to do so. The readiness of persons to sign contracts
with clauses that authorize extensive investigation and waive the
signer's right to assert legislatively granted privileges demonstrates
the ease with which individuals can be induced to barter their privacy protections for a present benefit. Thus, the implication of the
reasonable expectation doctrine into the computer privacy area could
sanction any use the information-gathering organization chose to
make of personal data.
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Finally, precedent for the control of private information can be
found in the concept of legally protected privileges. Such privileges
traditionally allow a client, a patient, or a penitent to prevent his
attorney, doctor, or minister from revealing information transmitted
in confidence in the course of their special relationship. It is not
inconceivable that a similar privilege could be granted to the communication between a beneficiary (e.g., credit or welfare applicant)
and his intended benefactor.
II.

CHANGING CONCEPTS OF PRIVACY

The direct dangers to privacy posed by insensitive computer
operators may be minimized by careful regulation of the use of collected personal data. However, this approach assumes that the broad
availability and distribution of the type of personal information involved is socially deleterious, an assumption subject to challenge.
Professor Miller points out that
the public may lose its sense of the private if large-scale transfers and
dissemination of personal information become common.... People
accustomed to the revelation of sensitive personal data eventually
may define most information as public and place it beyond the law's
protection. [p. 181.]
This observation reveals the fact that privacy is a changing concept
that reflects social expectations. What is private at one time in history may be the subject of ostentatious exposure at another.12 These
changes result from an evolutionary modification of basic attitudes
that are neither right nor ·wrong; they are merely different. Consequently, the fact that the public sense of privacy is being changed by
the impact of computer technology may be part of a natural and
healthy adaptation to an electronic era. In fact, this adaptation
phenomenon may contain the solution to some of the negative implications of data surveillance. As the public becomes accustomed to
the exposure of "personal" information, it is likely that the morbid
curiosity of the gossip mongers will become sated13 and the anx.iety
accompanying revelation will gradually disappear. In a world in
12. A short look at contemporary history illustrates the point. At the turn of the
century the entire female body was a "no-peeking'' preserve. The pulchritude of the
ankle, calf, and thigh was carefully hidden as part of the private domain reserved for
the good lady's husband. The "Peeping Tom" who stole a glimpse of a woman in a
state of semi-undress truly violated that woman's privacy. Today, semi-nudity is a
mode of dress which reflects a generation gap in privacy concepts. The point is that
nothing is inherently private, that privacy reflects the mores of changing times.
13. The recent e.xperience in Denmark with the Copenhagen sex shows wherein
performers engaged in all forms of sexual activity on stage demonstrates how quickly
the "excitingly different" can become gross exhibitionism. The triumph of the
"Peeping" or "Listening" Tom is to see or hear something he is not supposed to
witness. Take away the prohibition and you remove the incentive.
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which everyone has access to the petty details of the lives of his
neighbors, human foibles and misadventures become small in their
proper perspective. In this light it may not be clear that the government ought to interfere by artificially reinforcing particular disposable notions of privacy.H
Much of the demand for privacy is a conditioned response. It
can be posited that the sense of privacy is basically a product of
the desire to defend oneself from public attitudes that do not coincide ·with certain personal behavior, that one seeks to keep private
only that information that can harm him if disclosed. Privacy allows
a person to project an image that is not a true reflection of his
thoughts and conduct. The selection of the desired image and, consequently, the information to be kept from the public eye are usually
a direct result of contemporary social norms. Thus, the kinds of
things regarded as private vary according to acceptable social standards. Sexual behavior, for example, is not universally viewed as an
activity that is to be blanketed by concepts of privacy. Even within
the "civilized" nations there is a broad disparity in the type of information that is viewed as private and that which is viewed as not.
A young unmarried woman in Sweden does not suffer a pang of
discomfort if her employer learns she is living with her boy friend,
while her Italian counterpart might feel that her private world has
been invaded by such a disclosure. The difference is not related to
the inherent moral quality of the conduct but to the capacity of the
revealed fact to cause damage.
The assumption that the data accumulation of the computer violates privacy may also be attacked on the ground that the kind of
information collected is not really private in nature. While the typical pro-privacy ploy is to hypothesize a surveillance device in the
bedroom, recording and reporting the most intimate activities, the
reality is that the type of information generally involved is already
semi-public. For example, what a person earns is known by literally
dozens of comparative strangers, his employer, the payroll clerk,
those who cash the check, his family, his creditors, tax men, and often
co-workers. Similarly, an individual's employment experience or
contact with the law is a matter of record. The intrusiveness of the
complete dossier comes from its ability to piece together hundreds
of known facts into a total revealing picture. It is a case in which
the sum is greater than its component parts.15 The right to privacy
14. In purporting to defend a person's prerogative to preserve the privacy of
primarily nonpernicious information, perhaps Professor Miller's proposals only protect
his personal sense of propriety premised upon outmoded and artificial precepts.
15. For example, Professor Miller points out that the average person leaves clear
tracks of his life through such things as airline and hotel reservations, credit card
slips, canceled checks, and telephone records. However, only the detective who has
access to all the information can accurately determine the subject's spending habits,
his associations and, at the same time, reconstruct his activities.
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in this context is nothing more than the right to prevent available,
freely given, nonintimate information from being collected and
stored in one place. In essence, as society's detective capacities become efficient enough to evince an undeniable profile of an individual, the demand to disarm the detective increases. But, at the
very least, it can be argued, the type of "privacy invasion" accomplished by information-storing computers is of a different dimension than that caused by the use of surveillance devices that
without consent intrude upon one's solitude or intimate relations.
Moreover, the alteration of traditional notions of privacy may be
part of a psychologically healthy movement to "tell it like it is."
Hypocritical social values are often spawned and perpetuated behind
a curtain of privacy. The shame implied by the need to conceal true
facts and feelings may reflect a denial of the intrinsic worth of man's
individuality. While it has been suggested that privacy is an aspect
of human dignity, 16 a more accurate perspective may reveal it as
little more than an escape hatch from the vengeance of an intolerant
society that accords no respect to the individual for what he is. If
society were truly to acknowledge and nurture human dignity, the
concept of privacy might become superfluous.17
The response to these arguments that minimize the significance
of computers to the maintenance of privacy values is based more on
value judgments than on logic. To ignore such judgments simply
because they do not represent immutable truths misses the whole
point of the privacy concept. While it is true that man can be
conditioned out of the urge for privacy as it relates to specific situations, it is not likely that he can be led to forgo all manner of private life. As Alan Westin has indicated, privacy is closely related
to the concept of personal autonomy that is an instinctive urge of
all men. 18 The suggestion that man should be allowed to adapt to a
changing world in which privacy is discarded is really quite sophistic.
16. See Blaustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean
Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962 (1964).
17. A homosexual under present values may live in constant peril of exposure. To
him privacy is crucial to conceal or disguise every hint of his social aberration. However, if the homosexual were to be accepted for his intrinsic worth as a person with
no regard to his personal sexual appetites, he could live freely and unself•consciously
without the need for the constantly closed door.
18. The relevant remark did not escape Professor Miller's optical scanner. A. WESTIN,
PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 34 (1967), is quoted as follows:
[D]evelopment of individuality is particularly important in democratic societies,
since quality of independent thought, diversity of views, and nonconformity are
considered desirable traits for individuals. Such independence requires time for
sheltered experimentation and testing of ideas, for preparation and practice in
thought and conduct, without fear of ridicule or penalty, and for the opportunity
to alter opinions before making them public. The individual's sense that it is he
who decides when to 'go public' is a crucial aspect of his feeling of autonomy.
Without such time for incubation and growth, through privacy, many ideas and
positions would be launched into the world with dangerous prematurity. [p. 49.]
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Man can also adapt to the industrial rape of the environment and in
a generation view a polluted stream without a "pang of discomfort."
The question raised by The Assault on Privacy is, Should he adapt
or fight? It is certainly a valid question and one that must be answered before the decision becomes irrelevant.
With regard to the argument that semi-public information should
not fall within the ambit of privacy protection, one must return to
the personal autonomy aspects of human psychology. While thousands of people and organizations may know separate facts about an
individual, so long as there is no centralization of these facts no
one person or organization has the power to use the total information package to the individual's disadvantage. As Professor Miller
puts it:
[W]hen an individual is deprived of control over the spigot that
governs the fl.ow of information pertaining to him, in some measure
he becomes subservient to those people and institutions that are able
to manipulate it. [P. 25.]
Although freedom from the manipulation of semi-public information may be a facet of privacy distinct from those that relate to an
individual's intimate relations and moments of self-searching solitude, it is cut from the same stone and merits careful concern.
The "tell it like it is" argument is a bit more facile. There can
be no question that privacy is, among other things, a defense against
the intolerances of society, and that the more intolerant the society
the greater is the need for the shelter of secrecy. However, history
has yet to produce the civilization without its biases and prejudices.
In fact, the right to form negative opinions of those who diverge
from deeply held moral values may be as important to a free society
as the right of privacy itself. In the last analysis the issue should be
one of personal choice, not public commandment. If an individual
homosexual, for instance, chooses to run the gantlet of social disapproval and confront the injustice directly by making his life public, he should certainly be free to do so. It is not clear, however, that
his more timid and psychologically frail counterparts ought to be
drafted into the battle by a public policy that deprives them of their
shields of privacy. If the key to privacy is individuality, the decision
to dispense with privacy ought to be left in the hands of the individual.
III.

ACCURACY OF INFORMATION

Another major danger of widespread computer surveillance
pointed out in The Assault on Privacy really has nothing to do with
privacy per se. This danger relates to the unjustified harm that can
be done to a person who has inaccurate or misleading information in
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his file. Once the right to acquire and use personal information is
acknowledged, the way in which the data are collected and recorded
becomes vital.
Professor Miller points out, with calculated effect, that a common source of credit information gathering is neighborhood gossip.
This secondhand, often malicious information is translated into
cold, hard-looking data in a computer printout, a process which
illustrates what Miller refers to as the GIGO principle (Garbage In,
Gospel Out). Furthermore, accurate but incomplete information
also subjects the individual to contextual inaccuracies that distort the
truth. Both of these dangers may be effectively mitigated by imposing
tort liability upon those who cause harm through the use of inaccurate or misleading information, and by requiring that each datasubect be given notice of information contained in his file and an
opportunity to set the record straight.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The Assault on Privacy is a successful book. While it makes no
attempt to cope with all the philosophical problems of privacy, it
defines precisely the actual and threatened impact of computer technology on common concepts of privacy. By providing an explicit
description of the present state of the problem and innumerable
examples of what could happen, Professor Miller informs his reader
of the considerations and consequences of modern technological developments. While The Assault on Privacy reveals the author's own
biases, it supplies enough information to allow independent rational
judgment. No more can be expected of a work of this kind.
:Michael S. Josephson
Associate Professor of Law,
Wayne State University

